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Ethnicity, Autonomy and Governance - The Maras: A Case Study | Ethnicity, Autonomy and Governance - The Maras: A Case Study - The Maras: A Case Study |
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| Written by Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Sushil K. Pillai, PVSM | ||||||||
| Tuesday, 25 July 2006 | ||||||||
Page 2 of 6 Autonomy The purpose of autonomy is to establish a "political arrangement to allow ethnic and other groups claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct control over affairs of special concern to them while allowing the larger entity those powers which cover common interests."12 There are many shades of meaning to 'Autonomy' as also various forms. While granting autonomy is a political decision, its operation and infrastructure are primarily bureaucratic within a particular political paradigm. And it also serves as the reason for successful and failed autonomies.13 More often than not, autonomy is considered a panacea for ethnic conflicts, particularly by a ‘soft state’. However, it is not necessarily so, as is evident in the failed autonomy scenario of the Bodo ADC. Autonomy unites people (Maras) as well as divides (Mara-Lai) or marginalises (Mizo-Mara) sub-communities. Minorities, depending on their size and location, react differently to the major communities. While some smaller groups (Lamkhangs, Monsangs, Fanais) voluntarily get assimilated, particularly those from the periphery, the larger groups (Nagas, Mizos) at the periphery tend to opt for secession when they feel threatened by assimilation and neglect. Since the same ethnic groups live across the border, this aspect has to be factored in through measures like easing trade and movement of people as well as new measures for border management beyond trade and security. Autonomy based on the principles of minority rights, indigenous rights and right to self-determination is intended to give a community or region substantial powers of policy, administration and fiscal resources. It also aims to preserve and promote the traditional indigenous culture. In reality, an examination of how autonomy is being exercised in the NE shows that it is akin to the curate’s egg because these are not only a reflection of ADC-State relations but also of Centre-State relations.14 Grant of autonomy to regions on the periphery is, invariably, grudgingly conceded due to fears of secession. These fears can be allayed when one looks at the various types of autonomies that are being practiced elsewhere. China, with its 55 ethnic/ nationality groups, offers a variety of autonomies like the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ (China-Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau) and ‘Regions’, ‘Prefectures’ and ‘Counties’, ‘Special Economic Zones’ and ‘Nationality Townships’15. The Myanmarese also have ‘Nationality Townships’ (Maras) and ‘Self Administered Zones’ (Nagas). While there is no doubt that autonomy as granted to the Northeastern States is a good measure, the contention here is that it is a part of the problem and not the solution: * When autonomies were granted based on the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, there was a large space between the individual and village, on the one hand, and the State, on the other. In the colonial period, this space was occupied by a lean British administrative set up and by the various social organisations of the Church. There were no larger traditional institutions of governance in this space, as there were only village republics. In the post-Independence era, government agencies and insurgent movements have occupied much of this space. Indeed, at the village level, certain governmental structures like the Block Development Officer and the Circle Officer have eroded the traditional machinery of village self-governance rather than incorporating them into the system. * Autonomy for underdeveloped areas can easily slip into separatism and consequently weaken democratic unity as also its institutions. The minorities (Chakmas, Brus – also called Reangs, Maras vs. Mizos) in the ‘Little Community’ feel discriminated against and seek further autonomy (UT status for the Maras). Poor exploitation of natural resources and inadequate economic infrastructure, combined with the lack of trained manpower, forces the state to become the largest employment agency. The obverse side of a high literacy rate is educated unemployed, which the government cannot now absorb. All these culminate in a spiral of dissatisfaction. * Autonomy in the NE is perceived mainly in ethnic terms. This results in an inevitable conflict between autonomy and over dependence on the Centre because of the lack of an economic base. It also changes the focus of attention. Instead of tackling the real issues of isolation and of socio-economic development, the focus of attention shifts towards the accommodation of competing ethnic claims. * The Simon Commission in 1929 noted that "(the tribes) do not ask for self determination but for security of land tenure, freedom in the pursuit of the traditional methods of livelihood and reasonable exercise in their customs." In the post–Independence era, these demands for autonomy were viewed by the government as potential threats of secession and handled accordingly. Autonomy is easier to handle when state sovereignty is not questioned. * The concepts of autonomy as viewed by various insurgent groups also need to be studied. These are not necessarily liberal or uniform. The 1971 Yezhabo (Constitution) of the Federal Government of Nagaland envisages traditional autonomous village republics as part of a federation of regions with no right to secession. Christianity and ancient Naga religion are the recognised state religions.16 In the case of the Nagas, its three main groups have different territorial definitions of their homeland. |
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| Last Updated ( Tuesday, 25 July 2006 ) | ||||||||
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