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Ethnicity, Autonomy and Governance - The Maras: A Case Study | Ethnicity, Autonomy and Governance - The Maras: A Case Study - The Maras: A Case Study |
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| Written by Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Sushil K. Pillai, PVSM | ||||||||
| Tuesday, 25 July 2006 | ||||||||
Page 4 of 6 Governance The idea of poor governance breeding poverty is an accepted thesis. But when poor governance becomes a willing or unwilling collusive partner with terrorists and secessionist groups, it begets a stable anarchy. Many of the ills of the Northeastern States have been traced to corruption in the agencies of governance or of individuals who represent the powers of the state. What is often neglected, however, is the manner in which the lack of certain institutions and rules of governance, especially in the regions that have been granted autonomy, breeds corruption. Consequent public dissatisfaction becomes a fertile ground for parochial ethnic calls for secession or demands for further autonomy in the vain hope that a better scenario would unfold. An additional factor not vectored adequately enough into governance is that the peripheral location of these States demands a closer socio-economic and security relationship with neighbouring States. Grants of autonomy are, more often than not, hurried due to mounting political pressure or action. A significant function of governance is to provide intelligence flow and a holistic picture so that the ensuing political decision is not mistimed. R D Pradhan, the then Union Home Secretary, has given a remarkable account of how the Assam Accord was signed in a hurry because an arbitrary date had been fixed for its announcement on August 15, 1985. Both the parties, the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the Government of India (GOI), were aware that parts of the Accord were not implementable, and yet it was signed, because the primary aim of the AASU was to secure political power. An amusing side narrative mentioned in this context is that, when Rajiv Gandhi, the then Premier, did not approve of the phrasing of a particular draft clause, the Home Secretary’s response was: "Sir, I have worked enough in the UN to know that bad English always makes for good negotiations. So please leave the English alone."24 At the micro level, even programmes based on sound principles flounder when there is weak governance. The Village Development Board (VDB) in Nagaland, for all its flaws, is an excellent example of village autonomy, having both executive and financial powers. Yet, the budgetary allocation to the VDBs amounts to a bare 0.7 % of the budget.25 The impact of this local autonomy, in effect, does not amount to much. At the macro level, the role of civil society in governance needs far more attention than is currently accorded. Of the many theories on the constituents of governance, one view identifies four major constituents: (a) Policy implementation, (b) Sound administration, (c) Implementation of economic development and (d) Security management.26 A United Nations (UN) paper27 identifies six aspects: (a) Involvement of civil society in governance; (b) Responsiveness of the Government to the will of the people through various organisations – mainly political; (c) Formulation of policy; (d) Execution of policy (the bureaucracy); (e) Regulating the economy; and (f) Judicial management and conflict resolution. Irrespective of the classification, there is need for a much greater involvement of civil society in governance in the NE. In some of the States, the Church generates most of the social and community work and there are also certain strong and effective youth and women’s organisations, as well as Human Rights groups. Traditional organisations like the Naga Ho-Hos are also in operation. Yet, neither the State government, Central government nor the civil polity has exploited the tremendous potential of co-opting civil society. The three thrust areas that need attention are: * Development of Human Infrastructure: this is as important as building economic infrastructure. For this, development of knowledge centres, data banks and research centres is essential, and centres of excellence have to be established. While there is a Regional Documentation and Information Centre at Shillong and similar centres in State capitals in the North East, these do not provide the variety of information needed by researchers. For instance, there is inadequate data about how and when various insurgencies have mutated to combine with organised crime and whether any pattern of transition emerges. Information should not only be accessed but should also be disseminated to grass root levels by volunteer groups. The Internet home pages of governments and secessionist groups on the web provide only ‘Performa’ information, more often than not outdated. * There is a need for more institutionalised arrangements directed towards the psychological integration of the NE with the rest of the country. The present arrangement of two Core Groups at the Union Home Ministry level and Inter-media Publicity Coordination Committees at State levels is grossly inadequate. Furthermore, radio transmission systems are weak and ineffectual. The number of students from the NE studying in other parts of the country is approximately 9,000 at any given time. One would expect that, on return, they would be a positive amalgamating influence. Yet, that is not so. A potential binding force is not being utilised. Objectively considered, there is no media policy for the NE, though of late the Home Ministry is disseminating information through pamphlets and brochures; these, however, lack detail. * Ethnocentrism can be tackled at three levels: * at the political and institutional level, through negotiations, cease-fires and education policy. The key issues in this context are power sharing and safe guards regarding land, natural resources and cultural practices; * through awareness generation at the grass roots level, where innovative techniques and information exchange patterns are practiced. For example, at Siphir in northern Mizoram, the villagers have grouped together to market squash, avoiding the formalities of a cooperative. Similarly, at Longsa in Nagaland, the villagers have set up a micro economy for providing Mokokchung town with the bulk of its requirements of soya beans; * at the level of the intelligentsia where there is a search for an appropriate dynamic for peoples’ movements. For example, Niketu Iralu’s peace efforts. |
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| Last Updated ( Tuesday, 25 July 2006 ) | ||||||||
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